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Climate Change Mitigation and the U.N. Security Council:  
A Just War Analysis 
 
Harry van der Linden 
1. 
Prior to the agreement on climate change adopted in December 2015 in Paris during the twenty-
first session of the Conference of Parties (COP 21), under the auspices of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), quite a few scholars had discussed and 
favored a robust role of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in bringing about effective global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. More hesitantly, some have supported the UNSC authorizing 
military action against countries failing to mitigate in an adequate manner.1 I will argue here that 
the shortcomings of the Paris Agreement are such that providing the UNSC with the authority to 
enforce climate change mitigation through military coercion remains a significant option. To be 
sure, the recent decision of the Trump administration to seek withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement means that the United States, for the time being at least, will likely veto any UNSC 
authorization of military action aimed at climate change mitigation, but a vetoed decision would 
still put moral and political pressure on countries with poor mitigation records, including the 
United States, to improve their record. Also, a vetoed decision would be significant in providing 
moral support for similarly motivated military action toward climate change mitigation outside 
 
1. Lango, “Global Ethics and Global Climate Change,” supports UNSC authorization of military action as 
a last resort measure, especially if the UNSC would become more representative; Scott, “The 
Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” views it as potentially beneficial and focuses on the 
likelihood of it happening (which she views as low); Ng, “Safeguarding Peace and Security in our 
Warming World,” briefly notes some problems with a military response but she does not want to exclude 
it; and Christiansen, Climate Conflicts, argues generally that future UNSC military authorization might be 
justified. Cousins, “UN Security Council,” maintains that UNSC coercive climate action is legally 
feasible but politically unrealistic, leading her to favor the UNSC playing a peaceful conflict resolution 
role between states with opposed adaptation and mitigation goals. Finally, Gilley and Kinsella, “Coercing 
Climate Action,” think UNSC authorization is unlikely but hold that limited military force might be 




the UNSC framework. I will argue, however, that the option of the UNSC coercing GHG 
mitigation is morally flawed and ultimately antithetical to effectively addressing climate change. 
My assessment will be based significantly on jus ad bellum principles of the just war tradition, 
taking into account some feminist critiques of this tradition. Relatedly, I will briefly contest Bill 
McKibben’s proposal that we should view climate change as a third world war, requiring a 
mobilization similar to the one undertaken to defeat fascism in World War II. More broadly, I 
will argue in conclusion that “war is not the answer” with regard to avoiding disastrous climate 
change; rather, hope is to be found in massive nonviolent resistance to non-mitigating countries 
and increased local efforts of adopting green technologies.  
 
2. 
Understandably, after more than two decades of failed global climate change negotiations, the 
Paris Agreement was widely praised and even celebrated in the public media. Yet the Agreement 
failed to live up to its proclaimed aim [stated in Article 2 (a)] of “holding the increase in the 
global average temperature to well below 2° C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5° C above pre-industrial levels.” The problem is that the 
promised GHG mitigation goals, including both reduced GHG emissions and larger GHG sinks, 
as voluntarily set by most states participating in COP 21 fall far short of ensuring this aim and 
are expected to lead to as much as 3° C rise in global average temperature by the end of the 
century.2 The Paris Agreement seeks to deal with this problem by committing states to adjust and 
improve every five years, beginning in 2020, their mitigation goals, which are called “Nationally 
Determined Contributions” (NDCs), and this process is supposed to continue until the aim of 
global average temperature increase well below 2° C is met. Will this process be effective? 
On a positive note, the ratification of the Paris Agreement required that at least 55 
countries accounting for at least 55% of global GHG emissions signed the Agreement, and this 
requirement was met in early October 2016. Thus the Agreement went into force on November 4, 
2016. A crucial step toward ratification was that China and the United States at the G20 summit 
in China (September 2016) provided notice of ratification. A worry was that (former) President 
Obama sidestepped the treaty confirmation role of the Senate in the ratification process, 
reflecting that the Senate might not have ratified the Paris Agreement due to general Republican 
 




hostility to GHG mitigation. This hostility was again on display in broad Republican support in 
Congress for President Trump’s decision on June 1, 2017, to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.  
In his withdrawal announcement, Trump defended his decision primarily by arguing that 
“the Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement 
that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries.” Trump 
specifically mentioned that the Paris Agreement allows China “to increase [its] emission by a 
staggering number of years – 13,” while “India makes its participation contingent on receiving 
billions and billions and billions of dollars in foreign aid from developed countries.” He 
continued: “There are many other examples. But the bottom line is that the Paris Accord is very 
unfair, at the highest level, to the United States.” Trump echoed here a complaint of unfairness 
launched by the United States since the earliest attempts to negotiate a climate change agreement 
centered on the notion that different demands should be placed on developed and developing 
countries since the developing countries have shorter histories of significant GHG emissions than 
most developed countries and so are lesser contributors to climate change, have much lower per 
capita emissions than most developed countries, and seek rapid growth, if necessary with cheap 
fossil fuels (as did once the developed countries). The problem with the Paris Agreement is not 
lack of fairness, but that the peak emissions of most developed nations are not reduced quickly 
enough and that those of China are delayed until 2030 and those of India have an open-ended 
date, making projected global mitigation fall short of the goal of keeping the global temperature 
increase well below 2° C.3 What adds to the problem is that the Green Climate Fund, established 
in 2010 (at COP 16) to enable developing countries such as India to adopt green technologies 
more rapidly (and also assist in the adaptation to climate change), might not be large enough to 
sufficiently reduce their peak emissions at an early enough date. Surely, the Trump 
administration has added to this problem by refusing to fulfill the initial American pledge, 
grossly overstated by Trump, of 3 billion, 1 billion of which was paid by the Obama 
administration. 
 
3. See Climate Action Tracker, “Rating countries.” Ironically, Trump in his withdrawal speech also notes 
the inadequacy of the Paris Agreement. He overstates the issue, claiming that the agreement will reduce 
global temperatures only by 0.2° C, and then argues that the economic costs for the United States are not 
worth it. Trump’s argument does not mean that he takes anthropogenic climate change seriously now 
(after having called it a “hoax” on earlier occasions); after all, no mention is made in his speech of how to 





The long-term impact of the American withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is uncertain. 
The withdrawal will not be completed until close to the next presidential election and new 
leadership might re-engage with the Agreement. The negative impact of the withdrawal and the 
support of the Trump administration for weakening EPA regulations affecting GHG emissions 
and expanding fossil-fuel extraction, including coal, within the United States will to some extent 
be offset by the fact that a large number of state governments, such as California and New York, 
and numerous cities have declared to uphold the Paris mitigation target of the United States or go 
beyond it. China and the EU might also in response to the withdrawal accelerate the 
implementation of their mitigation goals.4 Still, the withdrawal of the United States as the 
world’s second largest GHG emitter is a clear setback and might lead other countries to weaken 
their renewable energy endeavors. More generally, the rise of nationalism and rightwing 
populism does not bode well for the articulation of NDCs focused on the interest of future 
generations rather than on short-term national interests. In short, the Paris Agreement might not 
only fail to meet its ultimate temperature reduction aim, but it also might fail to realize even its 
current NDC promises. Once the Agreement unravels, the world might be on its way, in a 
manner that could be largely irreversible, from severe climate change (occurring with a 3° C 
increase in global average temperature) to catastrophic climate change (occurring with an 
increase in global average temperature above 5° C).5 The Paris Agreement offers little to prevent 
its unraveling since it lacks any enforcement mechanism other than the public naming and 
“shaming” of countries that fail to meet or improve their NDCs.6 
 
3. 
In light of the weaknesses of the Paris Agreement, the uncertainly created by American 
withdrawal, and the extreme urgency of effectively addressing climate change in the coming 
decades, it is important to consider recent proposals to the effect that the UNSC should address 
 
4. See Boffey and Neslen, “China and EU respond to Trump with a new climate alliance.”  
5. See Campbell and Parthemore, “National Security and Climate Change in Perspective.”  
6. The Paris Agreement does not cover aviation and international shipping, each accounting for as much 
as 3% of human-caused climate change. It is unclear at this moment whether the Trump administration 
will disregard various international arrangements (partly in progress) to reduce the climate change impact 
of these sources. In October 2016, the signatories of the 1987 Montreal Protocol eliminating the ozone-
depleting CFC refrigerants agreed to gradually phase out most of the current use of HFC refrigerants by 





climate change, including the most far-reaching suggestion that the UNSC take coercive 
political, economic, and military measures (Chapter VII measures) against individual states 
failing to mitigate. Certainly, we should expect that the voices for more UNSC involvement will 
become stronger if the Paris Agreement would begin to fall apart.  
Placing the authority to respond to countries with poor mitigation records in the hands of 
the UNSC seems a logical and final step of the so-called “securitization of climate change.” In 
the words of international relations scholar Shirley V. Scott, “securitization [in general] involves 
referring to an issue that has hitherto been conceptualized ‘only’ in political, economic, 
environmental or other terms as a security threat so as to heighten awareness of the issue and the 
urgency of taking effective action.”7 Examples other than climate change are the securitization of 
pandemic diseases and environmental degradation (such as loss of bio-diversity). The process of 
the securitization of climate change has been under way for some time. The UNSC debated 
climate change for the first time on April 17, 2007, and subsequently in 2011, 2013, and 2015. 
Overall, it seems that most countries from the Global South (G77) participating in these debates 
opposed making climate change an UNSC issue in any form, presumably being wary of 
“Western interventionism,” while many supporting countries of the North typically favored some 
non-coercive UNSC role.8 Still, there has also been a growing recognition among UNSC 
members (as well as within the UN at large) that global warming is a “threat multiplier” in that 
the effects of global warming, such as reduced resources (water, arable land, food), economic 
damage and land loss due to rising sea levels, and migration caused by environmental 
degradation, may deepen existing tensions and conflicts, both within and between states.9 And at 
a March, 2015, UNSC meeting, initiated by New Zealand, a sympathetic hearing was given to 
the concern of small island states that climate change, by causing rising sea levels and increased 
tropical storms, goes beyond being a threat multiplier and poses for them a direct existential 
security threat.10 In other words, climate change may not only increase sources of conflict, but 
may also pose a direct threat to state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the U.S. 
government and the Department of Defense (DoD) have recognized the security implications of 
 
7. Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 221. 
8. See Cousins, “UN Security Council,” 201-05. The notable exceptions among the G77 countries are the 
small island states, such as the Republic of Maldives. 
9. See Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 225-226. See also Gilley and 
Kinsella, “Coercing Climate Action,” 13. 




climate change, addressing the issue in the National Security Strategy of 2015 and the DoD’s 
Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (2014) and its National Security Implications of Climate-
Related Risks and a Changing Climate (2015).11 More specifically, it is widely acknowledged 
that the current conflict in Syria that began in 2011 has been partly caused by social and political 
unrest rooted in its climate change-related extreme drought between 2007 and 2010. 
Since climate change has undeniable security consequences, the UNSC, if it has not 
already done so, will sooner or later adopt Chapter VII measures in response to conflict caused or 
worsened by climate change.12 Such UNSC measures would fall basically within the sphere of 
adaptation to climate change since the focus is on addressing the negative consequences of this 
change.13 Full securitization of climate change, however, would go beyond this type of action 
toward the enforcement of mitigation standards necessary to prevent irreversible severe or 
catastrophic climate change. In other words, the shift is from addressing only the consequences 
of climate change toward also addressing its causes.14 One way to envision this full securitization 
is that the UNSC would take Chapter VII measures with regard to states that fail to meet their 
NDCs or fail to make necessary adjustments to their NDCs at future COP meetings. 
Alternatively, the UNSC could set a global standard concerning the allowable per capita GHG 
emissions (with the aim of limiting global warming to well below 2° C) and adopt coercive 
measures against countries failing to meet this standard (even after they have acquired tradable 
GHG emissions permits from low-emitting countries). No doubt, this latter approach would be in 
theory more effective in curtailing climate change, but it would also be less feasible (both in 
terms of arriving at standards and enforcing them), and so let me focus on the first approach.15 
Let me call a state that fails to meet or improve its NDC a “non-mitigator.” The non-mitigator 
may be a free-rider or blindly hope that future technology will solve the problem; or the failure 
to mitigate adequately may be rooted in a denial of climate change or in the conviction that 
 
11. The DoD reports are also concerned with how the U.S. military can reduce its GHG footprint and how 
it should anticipate changes in its operations due to climate change, such as rising sea levels.  
12. Scott suggests that the UNSC already passed a Chapter VII measure with Operation Restore Hope in 
response to the crisis in Somalia partly caused by climate change-induced drought. See “The 
Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 223. 
13. See Scott, “Implications of climate change for the UN Security Council,” 1321, 1326.  
14. Ibid., 1326. 
15. Cf. Ng, “Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World,” 292, who argues that instead of the 
UNSC setting its own standards, it would be better for the UNSC to enforce the mitigation standards of 




climate change is not significantly caused by human conduct. So, on this account, the United 
States is becoming a non-mitigator under the Trump administration, and India continuing on a 
course of economic nationalism and/or receiving inadequate international support for green 
technologies might become a non-mitigator. A full securitization of climate change would mean 
that the UNSC would consider Chapter VII measures against non-mitigators. Conceivably, the 
UNSC could also play a role in the enforcement of creating climate funds for mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries, and it could create a tribunal for political leaders committing 
the crime of non-mitigation. Moreover, the UNSC also could take Chapter VI (“Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes”) measures when disputes rooted in climate change would emerge. 
However, I will focus here on the following question: In case that the Paris accord would begin 
to unravel, should we support the UNSC taking military measures (after political and economic 
coercion has failed) to discourage and modify non-mitigators?  
 
4. 
A clear cost of this kind of full securitization of climate change is reduced participation by states 
in deciding an effective climate change regime and coercive measures taking the place of 
voluntary cooperation.16 The Paris Agreement involved the participation and cooperation of the 
community of states with most states articulating national mitigation goals to get the process 
going, and its ratification also required the explicit voluntary commitment of many states. The 
full securitization of climate change, to the contrary, places the responsibility of states to avoid 
severe or catastrophic climate change significantly in the hands of a small group of countries, the 
five permanent members of the UNSC and its additional ten rotating members, and this more 
limited participation of states will lead to coercive UNSC resolutions. What would offset the 
costs of reduced participation is that the UN General Assembly would initiate or encourage 
action against non-mitigators on basis of article 11 (3) of the U.N. Charter, allowing it to “call 
the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international 
peace and security.”17 At any rate, the costs would not constitute a decisive objection to full 
 
16. Cf. Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 222-23. 
17. Cf. Lango, “Global Ethics and Global Climate Change.” The General Assembly adopted a much 
weaker resolution in 2009 (GA Res. 63/281), maintaining that the UNFCCC is the “key instrument” 
addressing climate change but also calling on all relevant UN bodies to consider the security implications 




securitization of climate change if we were to conclude that UNSC climate action would be both 
effective and necessary in order to prevent the ravages of severe or catastrophic climate change. 
On the precipice, it might be justified to replace the persuasion of words by the persuasion of 
(threat of) weapons.  
However, does the UNSC, on the basis of the U.N. Charter, have the legal authority to 
adopt a resolution to resort to force, or to use the threat of force, in order to coerce non-
mitigators to mend their ways? In addressing this question, it is instructive to examine how Silke 
Marie Christiansen justifies a GHG mitigation role for the UNSC in her Climate Conflicts. On 
her account, the UNSC may authorize military measures when article 2 (4) of the U.N. charter – 
prohibiting all members from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state” – is violated. Controversially, Christiansen argues that we 
should interpret the “use of force” not just as involving the use of military force, but more 
broadly as collective human behavior that threatens or leads to the violation of state sovereignty. 
Most dramatically, states responsible for climate change cause this kind of violation when rising 
sea levels lead to loss of territory or even threaten statehood as in the case of such small island 
states as the Republic of Maldives. Christiansen notes that a problem with this analysis of the 
“use of force” is that damaging operations of nature caused by climate change, unlike military 
attacks, “are not necessarily humanly intended.”18 She responds that, in the future at least, large 
GHG emitters may be construed as hostile once green technologies become more readily 
available, affordable, and are not used by them on a wide scale. Thus Christiansen concludes that 
the UNSC should at least have a future role in responding coercively and militarily to such major 
hostile emitters.19  
A difficulty of Christiansen’s analysis is that it does not seem to offer a convincing 
guideline concerning which countries should possibly be subjected to UNSC actions. Unlike a 
military attack, climate change as “use of force” is foremost an emerging threat that will not fully 
materialize for many decades. To be sure, serious environmental damages are already occurring, 
as well as numerous human casualties, but they are small as compared to anticipated future 
 
GA reaffirmed the central role of the UNFCCC.  
18. Christiansen, Climate Conflicts, 183.  
19. Ibid., 184. See also ibid., 244. Christiansen argues against the idea that climate change is a threat that 
might trigger the right to self-defense against “armed attack” articulated in article (51) of the U.N. Charter 
because, among other reasons, “defining the emission of GHGs as armed attack will definitely overstretch 




harms if GHG emissions continue on their current trajectory. Looking to past GHG emissions, it 
would be hard to single out particular states as responsible for climate change since most states 
have contributed to the unfolding threat of rising sea levels for, say, the Republic of Maldives, 
and no specific state by itself made the difference so that it alone could be held responsible for 
the environmental threat. Of course, all major historical emitters could be collectively held 
responsible, but then who would authorize and execute UNSC resolutions against this collective? 
Looking forward to future GHG emissions, the main historical emitters are not necessarily the 
ones who will satisfy the requirement of hostile intention because they may adopt green 
technologies on a broad scale, while large future emitters with hostile intention might be overall 
less responsible for climate change than the main historical emitters because they might have 
limited GHG emission histories. And what further complicates the issue is that GHG emissions 
in one country (e.g., China) might be significantly caused by its production for export, placing 
the responsibility for the emissions partly in the hands of the importing countries.  
UNSC action against states failing to adhere to, or improve, their NDCs seems largely to 
avoid these difficulties of determining which countries should be liable to UNSC action. The 
UNSC has the legal authority to respond to “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression” (article 39). To view climate change as an act of aggression or a breach of the 
peace is questionable, but it is clearly a threat to the peace. We need not establish differential 
responsibility for causing this threat on basis of the GHG emission records of individual states. 
Instead, it suffices to note that the Paris Agreement seeks to reduce and prevent the threat. Non-
mitigators risk the unraveling of the Paris Agreement and so they pose a threat to the peace and 
are subject to UNSC action. The shift here is significantly from backward-looking responsibility 
and blame for climate harm to forward-looking responsibility for contributing to preventing 
climate harm, a shift that facilitates and encourages cooperation.20 However, blame becomes 
appropriate again with regard to non-mitigators, and the scale of GHG emissions remains 
morally relevant because the risk of the unraveling of the Paris Agreement will increase the 
greater role a non-mitigator has to play in reducing global GHG emissions. The UNSC in 
seeking to uphold the Paris Agreement should first implore non-mitigators to solve their dispute 
 
20. See Young, Responsibility for Justice. Following Young, climate change is a structural injustice and 
she argues that such injustices are best solved by switching from a backward-looking discourse of blame 





about their NDCs with other parties to the accord in a peaceful manner (Chapter VI measures), 
and if this would fail, Chapter VII measures culminating in military action would be appropriate.  
A serious problem with the UNSC authorizing military measures with regard to climate 
change is that three (China, the United States, and Russia) of the current top five GHG emitters 
(also including the E.U. and India) have veto power as permanent members of the UNSC (and 
France may veto on behalf of the E.U.). Thus, even if the non-permanent members would have a 
strong green agenda, the military measures would inevitably be selective and exclude some 
potential large non-mitigators. Generally, one would expect military actions are more likely to be 
authorized against militarily weaker non-mitigating countries, which also tend to be smaller 
GHG emitters. Accordingly, it is not surprising that, overall, countries from the Global South, 
even though they are likely to be the greatest victims of severe or catastrophic climate change 
because these countries will have fewer resources to deal with its negative impacts, have been 
least sympathetic to putting climate change on the UNSC agenda, fearing Western 
interventionism and neo-colonialism. Most immediately, UNSC military action against non-
mitigators is not to be expected since the United States as non-mitigator will not only veto any 
resolution against itself but also will likely veto any UNSC military action against other 
countries in order to avoid appearing blatantly hypocritical.  
Still, the option of considering UNSC military action against non-mitigators remains 
relevant for several reasons. First, the United States may rejoin the Paris Agreement and, so, 
military coercion against countries that willfully ignore their NDCs may become feasible. To be 
sure, this coercion would likely be selective and aimed at smaller military powers, but a case 
could be made that non-mitigating small countries set a bad precedent and the extreme urgency 
of addressing climate change outweighs the selectivity problem. Second, even if the United 
States were to veto all UNSC resolutions concerning military coercion against non-mitigators, a 
vetoed decision would still put moral and political pressure on non-mitigators to improve their 
record. Third, a vetoed resolution would offer moral support for mitigating countries to engage in 
military coercion against non-mitigators outside the UNSC framework. Certainly, repeated 
vetoed decisions would gradually create a norm of when military action against non-mitigators 
would be justified. We may then anticipate that this norm would come to guide military action 






This brings us to the crux of the matter: Can military force authorized by the UNSC against non-
mitigators be morally justified? This question, unlike the issues of whether the UNSC in fact will 
increasingly be concerned with climate change and has the legal authority do so, has not yet 
received much attention.21 Let me address this question on basis of just (resort to) war (jus ad 
bellum) principles, keeping in mind that the analysis bears more broadly on how we view the 
idea of (military) violence for the sake of combatting climate change. I have already addressed to 
some extent the jus ad bellum requirement that resort to military force must be decided by a 
legitimate authority – that is, an authority with moral competency and legitimacy. The UNSC 
has the legal authority to initiate military action against non-mitigators, but the veto system 
weakens its moral authority in that a more representative UNSC without the veto system is more 
likely to arrive at impartial decisions, taking into account a broader range of voices and interests. 
  Another problem with the moral authority of the UNSC is that this body lacks any 
articulated standards for deciding whether in a particular case resort to force is morally 
warranted. Notably, the UNSC did not adopt in 2005 “five criteria of legitimacy” recommended 
in A More Secure World, Report of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change. These criteria are similar to common jus ad bellum principles, and in 
the absence of such criteria UNSC resolutions might be decided by power politics rather than by 
seeking justice. Accordingly, UNSC resort to force against non-mitigators will inevitably raise 
the doubt that the decision might not accord with the jus ad bellum principle of right intention, 
requiring that both the decision to resort to military action and its execution are guided by 
justice, not extraneous political interests.  
A third jus ad bellum principle is that military action should have a reasonable chance of 
success. Success in the present context would mean that as a result of UNSC-initiated military 
action a non-mitigator would come to adopt adequate GHG mitigation measures, such as the 
widespread introduction of green technology and/or the adoption of consumption patterns with 
greatly reduced GHG footprints. What also seems to be necessary is that military action would 
affect the elimination of climate change ignorance and apathy within non-mitigating countries. 
How can military force affect these changes? Air campaigns as the current dominant mode of 
military coercion, say against coal energy plants, do not guarantee that greener technologies will 
 




be chosen; instead, dirtier coal burning might result. An extensive air campaign would also be 
inadequate because it does not create green “hearts and minds.” In short, regime change seems 
essential, and this requires troops on the ground as well as long-term political and cultural 
investments. The recent record of bringing about successful regime change through military 
force and aid is abysmal. It also raises the question: Which countries would deliver the military 
force and aid and would they be up to the task of changing “hearts and minds”?  
Admittedly, it might be the case that the use of military force, or the threat thereof, as 
well as coercive economic and political measures, may motivate a country to make some 
changes in its environmental policies. Perhaps such actions, for example, may stop the burning 
of tropical forests, especially when neighboring countries would be directly affected, but the 
issue here is not whether coercion can make some difference on some occasions. Rather, I am 
contesting that military force is a convincing coercive instrument that may lead a country to 
transform from a non-mitigator to an important supporter of and contributor to, a global 
mitigation program such as the Paris Agreement. 
The difficulties of a successful climate change mitigation war suggest that the 
proportionality principle might not be satisfied. A protracted war would be counter to the 
expected good of the war – greatly reduced GHG emissions – since war itself creates huge GHG 
emissions due to the fact that most mobile instruments of war are fuel-driven. An irony of the 
securitization of climate change is that the military is a major GHG emitter, in times of peace and 
especially when at war.22 Moreover, war is antithetical to reducing GHG emissions because 
refineries may be bombed, deforestation may occur, and, as previously noted, people may revert 
to cheaper and dirtier forms of energy, such as coal and dung, when energy grids are disrupted. It 
should also be noted that the production of the instruments of war involves high GHG emissions 
and the same is true of rebuilding the devastation that war typically leaves behind. So even if we 
would not incorporate other bad outcomes of war, such as the loss of human lives, the wounded, 
and the psychological casualties, and we would focus on GHG emissions alone, the bad results 
of war might outweigh its anticipated (but questionable) good results, and so a climate-change 
war might violate the principle of proportionality. 
More specifically, some of the Gulf States, such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, 
 
22. The Pentagon is the largest single consumer of petroleum in the world and contributes as much as 5% 




have the highest per capita emissions in the world. Now assume that these states continue with 
excessive fuel-driven consumption patterns and try to keep their market share by selling their oil 
cheaply. This would make them good candidates for military coercion. But then consider what 
happened during the Gulf War. The Iraqi troops withdrawing from Kuwait sought to destroy its 
resources, setting fire to hundreds of oil wells, which led to burning gas and oil for up to nine 
months, as well as to huge oil leaks on land and in the sea. A thousand people died because of 
smoke inhalation and the equivalent of several months of US GHG emissions went up in the 
air.23 It is not farfetched to assume that similar events might repeat themselves in protest against 
an UNSC-sanctioned military attack and occupation.  
The two final just war principles for assessing resort to force with regard to non-
mitigators are the just cause and last resort principles. I will briefly address the issue of last 
resort within the context of examining the just cause of UNSC-initiated war against non-
mitigators. Two questions seem essential. First, is climate-change war the type of war that we 
recognize as conceivably having a just cause? Second, can we justify war against GHG non-
mitigators in the sense that those individuals who enable their country to fall short in mitigation 
efforts are proper targets of force? In other words, is there something about these individuals 
who fail to address their GHG emissions or enable others to do so that justifies that violence is 
used against them or that their right to life is negated?   
We have previously noted that the threat posed by climate change, although presently 
unfolding, is foremost an emerging threat, i.e., a threat that will increasingly materialize if very 
significant mitigation does not take place. Accordingly, it seems most plausible to view military 
force authorized by the UNSC against non-mitigators as a preventive war (rather than as a war of 
self-defense): non-mitigators may cause the collapse of the Paris Agreement and once this accord 
falls apart it will be much harder and costlier to avert severe or catastrophic climate change in the 
future, and success might be uncertain and, at best, partial. One problem with this argument for 
preventive war is that it is more convincing with regard to very large GHG emitters than small 
emitters and war is least feasible against them. Furthermore, there are two familiar objections to 
preventive war, say, as it has been defended in the context of preventing “rogue states” from 
acquiring nuclear weapons (and other WMD): Just war theory traditionally has defined a just 
cause as involving a wrong done and in the case of preventive war there is only a suspicion of a 
 




future wrong; the principle of last resort is hard to satisfy since the anticipated wrong is a future 
wrong allowing for nonviolent measures to avert it. In the case of climate change preventive war, 
the problem that no wrong has been committed is less convincing since non-mitigation is an 
unfolding wrong and antithetical to climate change governance. Still, non-mitigating countries 
might promise to do much more at a later date, or they may engage in developing GHG 
absorption technologies, as well as new types of green energy, such as fusion, arguing that this is 
their contribution to the Paris Agreement.24 Such responses would make resort to force against 
these countries especially hard to justify. Relatedly, it is somewhat doubtful that the wrong done 
by small non-mitigators is really a threat to the Paris Agreement and could unravel it. After all, 
could other countries not compensate for the non-mitigators, increasing their mitigation efforts 
rather than opt for resort to force? Finally, the time frame of the dissolution of the Paris 
Agreement and the emergence of severe or catastrophic climate change is such that it becomes 
hard to stipulate that military force would be a last resort measure. There is enough time first to 
try diplomatic and non-military coercive measures and there is no clear point of when this 
endeavor should stop before the gathering dangers at the horizon allow no further delay of a 
military response. 
Even if we grant that non-mitigation in some scenarios might constitute a definite threat 
to the Paris Agreement (or any other global climate accord) of a magnitude such that resort to 
force would be a just cause, the just cause principle also requires that the threat is of a kind (type) 
that warrants killing. Typically, millions of civilians of a non-mitigating state participate in 
creating its unacceptable GHG emissions, and it seems indefensible to claim that their conduct 
makes them liable to military attack. To be liable to attack one must be instrumental in the 
infliction of immediate life-threatening violence, making counter-violence necessary to protect 
lives. Similarly, it seems an error to argue that those who would protect the civilians from attack 
and seek to preserve the political self-determination of their community would in this way 
become morally liable to attack. In other words, the soldiers of a non-mitigating state are not 
morally liable to attack for defending their state. To be sure, this self-defense might be wrong in 
some cases, as when soldiers protect their own civilians engaged in acts of genocide, but in the 
case of civilian non-mitigators the wrong done by the civilians, unlike the wrong done by 
 
24. For a criticism of technocratic approaches to climate change mitigation, see Klein, This Changes 
Everything, Part Two. Still, uncertainty about future technological possibilities may make it harder to 




genocidaires, is not of a nature that makes their protectors liable to attack. This leaves us with 
political and civilian leaders and their role in non-mitigation. If their support of non-mitigation 
expresses the popular will, then their shared responsibility does not make them liable to military 
attack. If the leaders act contrary to the popular will, then the appropriate response seems that the 
people should be encouraged to seek their replacement or overthrow. In my view, the only 
instances in which violence against non-mitigators might be appropriate is that the non-
mitigating countries would respond violently against nonmilitary UNSC measures aimed at 
promoting mitigation or would brutally repress nonviolent individual actions in support of 
mitigation. The actions may be local or originate from other countries. Since GHG emissions 
have no borders and affect humanity as such, foreign protestors of the emissions of non-
mitigating countries should be allowed to cross the borders of these countries and nonviolently 
express their opposition. The human rights of green nonviolent resisters, no matter their country 
of origin, should be protected by the global community, and harm against them should trigger 
coercive sanctions. By the same logic, non-mitigators have no right to refuse entry to climate 
refugees and the refugees should be protected from violence. In all these cases, the justificatory 




 Feminists have criticized the just war tradition and also articulated pacifist and non-
pacifist alternatives.25 Let me briefly discuss how the feminist critique applies to the proposal of 
full securitization of climate change, focusing on two common criticisms of just war thinking in 
general. The first criticism is that just war thinkers tend to use abstraction in ways that turn us 
away from the particular horrors of wars. The focus in just war theory is on principles and 
abstract causes, not on violence against the body. Most glaringly, talk about “precision strikes,” 
“strategic strikes,” “collateral damage,” and the like, move the mind away from burning flesh, 
 
25. I hold that the feminist critique of just war theory should be used to improve just war theory. This is 
also the view of Peach, “An Alternative to Pacifism,” 154, 164-67. More specifically, I have used this 
critique to support the view that just war theory needs to be supplemented by jus ante bellum (or just 
military preparedness) principles. See, for example, my “From Hiroshima to Baghdad.” For additional 




exploding brains, and the like.26 Now in the case of the proposal of the full securitization of 
climate change, it seems that abstract talk about “force” and “threat” may lead us astray. A 
military threat is rather different from a climate threat, and military force is rather different from 
the force resulting from climate change. Hostility is one feature of this difference, making war 
violence in various degrees personal. A storm is not a “wind of hate.”27 There is also a difference 
in suddenness and immediacy, leaving victims physically and emotionally paralyzed. 
Interpersonal violence especially cuts off all options and terrorizes. It is, of course, this 
psychological feature of violence that makes people fear terrorism beyond any proportion of its 
actual harm. Focusing on the nature of military violence should lead us to become more 
constrained about when counter-violence might be justified. It is only when violence is physical 
violence that the defining features of violence come to the foreground, making counter-violence 
necessary and just, while when violence is only a metaphor or a resemblance of violence we 
should reject counter-violence. In other words, we should reject physical (subjective) violence as 
a response to “climate force,” “climate threat,” “ecological violence,” and even “structural or 
systemic violence.”28  
A striking example of viewing climate change as violence is to be found in Bill 
McKibben’s recent essay “A World at War.” He writes: “We’re under attack from climate 
change…. World War III is well and truly underway. And we are losing…. Carbon and methane 
are seizing physical territory, sowing havoc and panic, racking up casualties, and even 
destabilizing governments…. It’s not that global warming is like a world war. It is a world war.” 
He adds: “The question is not, are we in a world war? The question is, will we fight back? And if 
we do, can we actually defeat an enemy as powerful and inexorable as the laws of physics?”29 
For McKibben, we will only win the climate-change world war if the people would mobilize in a 
way similar to the total mobilization of the American people in response to the threat of fascism 
after Pearl Harbor during the Second World War. Then we responded with rapid and massive 
development of weapons industries; now we should respond similarly by immediately creating 
on a massive scale solar panels and wind turbines. Then the people swept aside the isolationist 
 
26. See Peach, “An Alternative to Pacifism?,” 158. See also Hun, “An Evaluation of Feminist Critiques of 
Just War Theory.” 
27. Cf. Grossman, On Killing, 76-82, who uses this expression to refer to the deep trauma of being 
confronted with hostility, as distinct from threats lacking hostile intent.  
28. See in more detail in my “On the Violence of Systemic Violence.” 




“America Firsters”; now we must sweep aside the lack of cooperation and obstructionist policies 
of fossil-fuel industries. And, finally, we should not think that the Paris Agreement is victory and 
will take care of the unfolding threat of a world at war, replicating Chamberlain’s misguided 
hope after Munich. 
What is misleading about this analysis is that the anthropogenic character of climate 
change disappears: the enemy is “carbon and methane,” not, say, the fossil-fuel industries and 
factory farming. It is easy to see why McKibben argues this way: he has no place for soldiers 
killing those causally responsible for climate change. This is fair enough, but then the notion of 
climate change as war should be set aside. This notion also obfuscates the different character of 
military attacks and its harms and the operations of climate change and its negative impacts. 
Indeed, McKibben seems to indirectly acknowledge this latter point when he notes that one 
problem with the war of climate change is that there is no Pearl Harbor moment, mobilizing the 
people to fight against this war. McKibben appeals to a familiar idea that only war can push 
people to unite and concentrate their efforts on a common goal. There is some sad truth in this, 
but the idea neglects that war also creates hatred, virulent nationalism, etc. At any rate, the 
reference to World War II mobilization is flawed in that it is unlikely that the US government 
will direct and coordinate the fight against the “enemy”, as happened in World War II.30 Instead, 
it seems that organizing from below by environmental groups needs to (continue to) play a 
pivotal role, including obstruction of governmental policies and business practices counter to 
GHG mitigation. Another problem is that the portrayal of climate change as war suggests that 
optimal weapons (solar, wind, electric cars, etc.) are crucial to winning the “war,” neglecting that 
the broader issue is how capitalist society focused on growth and profit maximization is 
continuously undermining the natural environment conducive to human flourishing. In other 
words, we need not only a technological transformation but also a value transformation.31 
 This points to a second feminist critique of the just war tradition. In the words of Carol 
Cohn and Sara Ruddick, the critique is that “just war theorists tend to abstract particular wars 
 
30. Accordingly, calls for a World War II mobilization without describing climate change as a war are also 
flawed.  In Unprecedented Climate Mobilization, Woodworth and Griffin make such a call (26-53) and 
also discuss prior similar calls made during the past decade (39-41). More promising are their suggestions 
for nonviolent citizen strategies to transform the status quo (91-108).  
31. Cf. Godoy and Jaffe, “We Don’t Need a ‘War’ on Climate Change.” I am sympathetic to their view 
that what is needed instead of war is revolution, but it goes beyond the scope of this chapter to argue for 
this claim. Of course, my criticism of McKibben here is only directed against his essay “A World at War,” 




from the war system on which they rely and which they strengthen.” This “war system” involves: 
“arming, training, and organizing for possible wars; allocating the resources these preparations 
require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as morally legitimate, even alluring; and 
shaping and fostering the masculinities and femininities that undergird men’s and women’s 
acquiescence to war.”32 In terms of the securitization of climate change, the problem is that the 
neglect of the war system involves a neglect of how the preparation for war, materially and 
culturally, is antithetical to realizing strong GHG mitigation goals. We have already touched 
upon the material opposition between weapons production and testing, and fighting, on the one 
hand, and GHG mitigation on the other hand. The cultural opposition is that the dominant 
morality of war as an ethics of control, domination, hierarchy, and expansion seems rather 
opposed to the type of individual and social green ethics required to turn around climate change, 
that is, an ethics of simplicity, limitation, and humility concerning our place in nature.33 It also 
must be an ethics of resistance, but one that seeks, with an eye on future reconciliation, 
nonviolent action (protest, noncooperation, civil disobedience, and nonviolent intervention) 
toward opposing forces rather than their destruction. 
 
7. 
 In conclusion, the U.N. Charter aimed “to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war,” and it is certainly the case that climate change is a “threat multiplier” and may play a 
significant role in bringing about future conflicts. Still, the view of climate change as a threat to 
peace warranting UNSC authorization of military force to reduce the threat is mistaken. The 
harms of climate change and the violence of humans should not be equated, and mitigation wars 
will be counterproductive and in violation of just war norms. The idea that the UN Security 
Council can rescue us from severe or catastrophic climate change by enforcing a global 
mitigation schema is implausible and strengthens both materially and culturally the existing war 
system. War will indeed result when global mitigation fails, but it is likely to be war to maintain 
access to resources and arable land as well as to keep climate refugees out of the affluent 
countries. The best safeguard against a future of military eco-apartheid is a mass movement of 
 
32. Cohn and Ruddick, “A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 406.  
33. Cf. Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time, 186-87. More bellicose and realist understandings of just war 
theory seem to adhere to this morality of war, while Peach’s feminist reconceptualization of just war 




nonviolent resistance, solidarity, and green virtues and values.34 This movement should also 
materialize and strengthen its commitment to a future livable world by creating now the world 
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